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Abstract 
Purpose – Aims to explore and explain the extent partner organisations in Nigerian local 
regeneration partnerships demonstrate accountable and transparent practices in their 
partnership working. With some partnerships, able to attain set objectives, while others have 
failed to meet partnership expectations the implication of these practices in the country 
becomes worthy of consideration.   
Methodology/approach – Using an interpretive, inductive and explanatory approach, data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders involved in five 
infrastructure PPPs – a Bus Transport (BT) Partnership, a Rail Partnership, Kappa Housing 
Partnership, Gamma District Partnership and a Toll Road Partnership and analysed using 
thematic analysis.  
Findings – Five local regeneration partnerships were established with the partnerships having 
shared vision and common concerns in addressing the provision of infrastructure and public 
services in Nigeria. Due to the institutional nature of the empirical context of Nigeria, 
specifically in terms of accountability and transparency in partnerships operations, the five 
partnerships experienced varying levels of success based on the extent the agreed upon 
contractual agreements were met and the partnerships delivery on the agreed objectives.   
Originality/value of paper – This paper illustrates that much attention needs to be given to 
the extent to which partner organisations are given an opportunity to participate in the 
collaboration process in Nigerian local regeneration partnerships, the accountability that 
partners exhibit for actively engaging in the partnership process and the degree to which 
transparency exist between the partners within the partnership.    
Keywords -  Accountability, Transparency, Local Regeneration Partnership, Management 
Strategies, Nigeria  
Paper type - Extended Abstract   
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1. Introduction 
Partnership arrangements have been flourishing in the African context in recent years after 
many years of implementation in the Anglo-saxonised world during the 1990s and 2000s. It is 
evident from literature that the collaboration process from the formation stage through to the 
evaluation stage can be a difficult journey for public and private sector partners. Although, 
collaborations are usually taken to be a good thing, Asthana, Richardson and Halliday (2002) 
argue that it is significant to determine the conditions or factors that increase the probability of 
successful collaborations emerging. Himmelman (1996, p.28), defines collaboration as 
“exchanging information, altering activities, sharing resources and enhancing the capacity of 
another for mutual benefit and to achieve a common purpose”. In the context of PPPs, Gray 
(1996) offered a framework conceptualised along two dimensions in which she classified 
different inter-organisational collaborations; the factors that motivate partners to collaborate 
and the type of outcomes expected. According to this framework, collaborations involving 
collective strategies on how partners can implement a shared vision can be labelled as 
partnerships, whereby through their collaborative capacity, the partners gain appreciation of 
their interdependence.   
In some national contexts, the selection of partners for collaborative schemes such as local 
regeneration partnerships undergo a public tendering process, as is the case in the empirical 
context of the research; where government organisations are suggested to dominate the 
tendering process by setting out the bidding guidelines for potential partners (Camen, 
Gottfridson and Rundh, 2011; Mouzas and Ford, 2007). In this context, the factors determining 
whether or not collaboration with any organisation would developed is clearly specified in 
advance, this gives all potential partners the same opportunity to compete to be awarded the 
contract (Blomqvist, Hurmelinna and Seppanen, 2005). Furthermore, the value of collaboration 
could be identified within the capacity of partners from different organisations to combine their 
resources and expertise in order to create and sustain successful partnership working; this 
notion has been termed collaborative advantage (Kanter, 1994; Huxham 1996). Apostolakis, 
(2004) and Kanter (1994) further argue that, collaborative advantage defines a high value and 
ambitious form of collaboration and it is vital to the growing practice of partnerships. 
Consequently, when partners are encountering challenges in operationalizing their strategies, 
according to Huxham and Vangen (2004), the main values of the concept of collaborative 
advantage can raise the profile of collaboration and legitimise it as an activity worthy of 
resource investment. It has been pertinent in collaborative work to identify and form bases in 
which individual participants/organisations likewise funding institutions increasingly require 
tangible evidence based on certain performance criteria that their investments are generating 
intended outcomes and are achieved within a specific timeframe (Bovens, 2010). Partners 
therefore need to engage in a continuous process of encouraging the collaborative processes 
within the partnership working. 
This paper explores and explains the extent partner organisations in Nigerian local regeneration 
partnerships demonstrate accountable and transparent practices in their partnership working. 
Partnership working has been associated from literature with the extent to which all partners 
are given an opportunity to participate in the collaboration process, the accountability that 
partners exhibit for actively engaging in the partnership process and the degree to which 
transparency exist between the partners within the partnership.    
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2. Theoretical Considerations  
Transparency in decision-making processes 
Transparency refers to the visibility of decision-making processes and it is a requirement, 
which is grounded in governance ethics, of each partner organisation’s right to know about 
matters and decisions that affect the partnership process (Lockwood, 2010). Decision support 
systems such as detailed information indicating the reason behind each decision reached and 
the clarity and justification of every course of action is vital (Willems and Van Doreen, 2012). 
Akkermans, Bogerd and Doremalen (2003) argue that transparency in partnerships is as a result 
of reinforcing dynamic interactions between partners. They also state that the more partners 
work closely together, the more they will trust each other and the more mutual their 
collaborative working. This in addition will improve their performance level when working 
together, while further improving transparency in the collaborative process. Performance 
reporting is also an important element of transparency, as it is essential that these partnerships 
regularly disclose their progress through various mechanisms such as annual reports, reports 
of achievements as against intended goals and management effectiveness evaluations; this kind 
of information supports the accountability of partnership’s (Forrer et al., 2010; Lockwood, 
2010).  
 
• Collaborative commitment  
Partners need to be committed to creating something new or adding new value to the 
partnership arrangement. According to Coote et al. (2003), commitment exists when partners 
believe the collaboration is worth working on, but warrants maximum efforts to maintain or 
enhance it. Furthermore, commitment counters opportunism and determines transparency 
(Doz, 1996), as well as the willingness to collaborate, the propensity to enhance effectiveness 
because the partners can put their efforts towards desired outcomes (Coote et al., 2003; 
Goodman and Dion, 2001).  
 
• Collaborative communications 
The importance attached to opening up and ensuring wider channels of communication can 
affect how decisions are made and how the partnership’s working is taken forward (Andrews 
and Entwistle, 2010). Kasper-Fuherer and Ashkanasy (2001) argue that communication of trust 
and transparency requires that proper attention be given to collaborative processes of the 
partnership arrangement. Communication is defined as the formal and informal sharing of 
reliable and meaningful information between partners (Goodman and Dion, 2001). In other 
words, the communication of transparency in partnership arrangements is as an integral part in 
sustaining transparency in the partnership.  
 
 
Accountability of partners in the partnership working 
 
Transparency is argued to be a vital condition of accountability, but that it does not capture the 
whole process (Forrer et al., 2010). According to Willems and Van Doreen (2012), 
accountability is linked to the internal responsibility of partners where it is an important part 
of the institutional checks and balances system. They argue that accountability can play a 
greater role than expressed by the idea of answerability, such that accountability is more than 
the actual fact of being held accountable. Accountability is argued to be dependent upon well-
defined specification of goals, activities, roles and responsibilities and can be better achieved 
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in formal partnerships where these are clearly indicated (Buse and Walt, 2000). Hence, it is a 
continuous process of anticipation, identification, definition and responses to pressures, which 
eventually leads to certain actions. They further argue that partnership accountability involves 
how partners manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organisation. 
 
While accountability in the public sector, involve administrative and political structures that 
are accountable to the citizens through the contestability of political power and private sector 
accountability is usually to the organisation’s shareholders, Buse and Walt (2000) state that 
downward accountability is usually less straightforward and weak. Accountability in 
partnerships, therefore, is linked to the specific public reform efforts that emphasise high 
standards of collaborative arrangements. It requires the creation of appropriate procedures and 
decision rules which are embedded in the agreement safeguards to ensure that public services 
are not compromised for the sake of private profits. Forrer et al., (2010), state that as 
partnerships are linked to the specific collaborative arrangements created and the obligations 
and requirements that are designed to tie both the government and the private sector, it becomes 
imperative that the partnerships is designed properly. The authors further argue that if 
partnerships are poorly designed, there is no reason to expect that the goals of the partnership 
will materialise, and these may leave the public no better or probably worse off than if the 
public sector had relied on its own resources to carry out the local regeneration initiative. 
 
Accountability also requires that partners exercise their authority with integrity, in that they 
declare any conflicts of interest and behave honestly. These integrity conditions provide a 
platform for the partnership’s legitimacy that is consistent with key elements of trusting 
capabilities. Individual partners also have a responsibility to demonstrate commitment, through 
their decisions and actions, to the purpose and objectives of the partnership (Bovens, 2010). 
This depicts that failure by partners to actively pursue the partnership’s objectives is a disregard 
of the partnership’s agreement that undermines accountability. Furthermore, the partnership 
should be answerable to the community in which they operate. This is sometimes referred to 
as downward accountability (Skelcher, 2005); answerability in partnerships implies that the 
public has a right to question, challenge and express their approval or disapproval of the 
processes, plans, decisions and actions of the partnership arrangement. This places emphasis 
on the need for partnerships to pay due attention to and be close as possible to those people 
who are most affected by their decisions. Lockwood (2010) states that partnerships are also 
subject to ‘upward’ accountability, this can be required by law or by contract, though direct 
reporting mechanisms to a higher-level authority, or indirectly through publicly available 
reports that specifically address the partnership performance.  
 
 
3. Partnership Adoption and Implementation in Nigeria Local Regeneration 
The infrastructure challenge in Nigeria is considered huge, with Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic (AICD), country report 2011, suggested that in addressing Nigeria’s infrastructure 
challenges a sustained expenditure of around US$14.2 billion per year (about 12% of GDP) is 
required over the next decade, of which about $10.5 billion is needed for federal infrastructure 
alone. Currently, US$5.9 billion per year is being spent on federal infrastructure and this is 
equivalent to about 5% of the country’s GDP. In comparison, China in the mid-2000s spent 
about 15% of GDP on infrastructure development (Foster and Nataliya, 2011). Consequently, 
the Nigeria government is being faced with demand from the citizens to increase the provision 
of public infrastructure and social services.  
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The increase in the country’s population has led to an increase in demand for infrastructure 
across all sectors (Olaseni and Alade, 2012). Public sector provision of services and availability 
in Nigeria has been generally inadequate and unsustainable many citizens live without adequate 
access to basic amenities like potable water, transportation, sanitation systems and electricity 
(Idris, Kura and Bashir, 2013; Foster and Nataliya, 2011). This situation has been attributed to 
the inadequate financing system for infrastructure development and maintenance (Sanni and 
Hashim, 2014); the high cost of executing public utilities, mismanagement practices and the 
incessant corruption whereby considerable funds made available or revenues generated are 
embezzled by public officials have often lead to rise in project cost, abandoned, uncompleted 
projects and substandard infrastructure (Idris, Kura and Bashir, 2013; Olaseni and Alade, 
2012). 
Drawing on the practices and experiences of other developing as well as developed countries, 
the Nigerian government began to open its infrastructure markets to accommodate the private 
sector in the provision of key infrastructure and service delivery such as toll roads, power, 
waste management and water. Since the inauguration of the fourth democratic government in 
Nigeria in May 1999, there has been an active drive for commercialisation and privatisation 
programs to encourage private sector participation in the provision and delivery of quality 
infrastructure. The World Bank estimates that for every 1% of (government) funds invested in 
infrastructure lead to an equivalent 1% increase in GDP (Babatunde, Opawole and Akinsiku, 
2012). Ogochukwu and Bahir, (2013, p.102) also opine that a “good economic reform should 
bring about national renewal and transformation through systematic and faithful 
implementation in the polity. It seeks to change the status quo that ought to be changed. It 
requires proper planning and implementation, if desired ends are to be attained”. Furthermore, 
the functioning of socioeconomic infrastructure adds value to the comfort of citizens and it is 
also essential for a country’s productive activities due to the enabling environment for 
sustainable development (Ozohu-Suleiman and Oladimeji, 2015). 
Although, the Nigerian government has not had a long history of PPP implementation; 
however, there is the commitment of government to increase private sector participation, 
specifically in local regeneration projects. The provision of certain infrastructure in Nigeria, 
for instance roads has primarily been through budgetary allocations using traditional 
procurement arrangement by Federal, State and Local Governments, but in recent times PPP 
arrangements have been considered in this sector, as well as other sectors that cover airports, 
seaports, roads, rails, power and energy, markets complex development, university hostel 
development, housing and commercial offices, among others (Babatunde, Perera and Zhou, 
2016).  
The Nigeria’s government recognises that it faces the challenge for increased capacity for 
social and physical infrastructure provision even more so as the country’s population currently 
stands at over 173.6 million (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). In an address by the Minister 
for Budget and National Planning, Senator Udoma Udo Udoma on the 2016 budget and 
strategic implementation, the Minister made clear that the Federal Government would continue 
to support the use of Public Private Partnerships in the development of infrastructure and 
encouraged other Ministers to explore concession arrangements for airports, major roads and 
other infrastructure projects. He also stated that the Federal Government was working towards 
the establishment of an infrastructure fund, with the plan to raise about $25 billion within the 
next three years as part of efforts to encourage private sector participation in infrastructure 
(Udoma, 2016). Ninety-nine PPP projects have been under Infrastructure Concession 
Regulatory Commission (ICRC’s) custody since 2005; with forty-seven of those currently at 
various stages of implementation and the other forty-six at various stages of procurement or 
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development (ICRC, 2014).  
Although PPPs have enjoyed a global reach in popularity, there is still much to be known 
around the notion of partnerships, about what is new about partnerships in various empirical 
context, especially from the context of developing countries and what can be learned from these 
empirical contexts. From the discussion above, it can be argued that although considerable 
changes in reforms across various sectors are taking place in Nigeria, consequently, Nigeria 
provides a novel context for investigating the extent partner organisations in Nigerian local 
regeneration partnerships demonstrate accountable and transparent practices in their 
partnership working.  
 
 
4. Methodology 
Case studies are a common strategy for qualitative inquiry; they involve the use of qualitative 
data collection and of analytical methods that deal with meanings and quantitative methods 
that deals with numbers and measurements (Yin, 2009). They have been widely used as a 
qualitative research approach in various disciplines such as sociology, management, 
anthropology, history, political science, public administration, psychology and education. 
Qualitative case study is the chosen research strategy and it is appropriate in the areas of study 
where there is little understanding of how and why a phenomenon occurs or whether the 
phenomenon is dynamic and not yet developed (Grunbaum, 2007). Yin (2009, p.18) defines a 
qualitative case study has “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident”. 
 
 
Research context, data collection and analysis  
The geographical location of the five local regeneration partnerships investigated are in two 
geographically areas in Nigeria, the South-western part and the central part of the country. The 
partnerships investigated are: a Bus Transport (BT) Partnership, a Rail Partnership, Kappa 
Housing Partnership, Gamma District Partnership and a Toll Road Partnership (See table 1 for 
details of each partnership). Forty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
participants from both partnerships; the participants were from the public and private sectors; 
from different business units and from different managerial levels to ensure that diverse 
perspectives on the partnerships had been captured. Using semi-structured interviews provided 
the opportunity to investigate the activities and interactions that existed between the partners 
in both partnerships. The main selection criteria of participants were those involved in decision-
making processes, contract negotiations, as well as those involved in the operations and 
coordination of the activities of the partnership arrangement. The interviews followed a flexible 
thematic guide (Yin, 2009) and they varied between 50 to 125 minutes.   
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Case studies description 
The five case studies are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Partnership 
Details 
Name of Partnership 
Bus Transport 
Partnership 
Rail 
Partnership 
Kappa 
Housing 
Partnership  
Gamma District 
Development 
Partnership 
Toll Road 
Partnership  
Partnership 
Objective 
Alleviating the 
problems of high 
demand for 
transport 
services and the 
reduction in 
traffic 
congestion 
within the state 
To offer an 
alternative 
safe, reliable 
and 
environmental 
friendly mode 
of transport 
To help 
mitigate the 
country’s 
housing 
deficit 
To construct a 
comprehensive 
integrated civil 
infrastructure of 
one of the 
districts in the 
city  
To expand and 
upgrade of 
49.4km of 
existing road. To 
construct a 
further 20km 
coastal road 
Year of 
Award 
March, 2008  August, 2009  2001 October, 2010 2008 
Type of PPP Operate and 
Maintain 
(O&M) 
Operate and 
Maintain 
(O&M) 
Design, 
Finance, 
Build and 
Transfer 
(DFBT) 
Design, Finance, 
Build and 
Transfer (DFBT) 
Design, Finance, 
Build, Operate 
and Transfer 
(DFBOT) 
Concession 
Period 
5 years 25 years 2 years 5 years 30 years  
(Concession 
terminated after 
7 years) 
Partners A state 
government, 
supported by 
World Bank and 
two private 
sector bus 
operators 
A state 
government 
transport 
agency and a 
private sector 
consortium 
A federal 
housing 
agency and a 
private sector 
infrastructure 
developer  
A state housing 
agency, a private 
infrastructure 
company and a 
financial 
institution 
A state 
government, a 
SPV and a 
consortium of 
banks 
Sector Roads, Transport Rail, 
Transport 
Housing District 
Development, 
Lands and Works 
Toll Road 
Type of 
Work 
Construction of 
22km of road 
and 3.3m wide 
BRT lane; 
segregated bus 
ways, 28 bus 
shelters and lay 
byes at 26. 
The construction 
of 3 bus 
terminals and 
A 27km 
construction 
of the track 
and station 
infrastructure 
and operation 
of railway 
systems 
which 
includes 
trains, control 
351 low and 
medium cost 
housing units 
in the Kappa 
Estate in 
Abuja, 
includes 
infrastructure 
and general 
services 
improvement 
Construction of 
64.49km of 
network of roads, 
131.18km of 
storm water 
drainage, 
90.55km water 
supply pipeline, 
64.49km sewage, 
drainage, 
walkways, 
Expansion and 
upgrade of  
49.36 km of 
expressway 
from a four-lane 
dual 
carriageway to 
six lanes, the 
construction of 
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bus depots; 
provision and 
maintenance of 
road 
infrastructure, 
traffic signs, 
road markings as 
well as other 
traffic 
management 
measures 
systems, 
electric power 
signalling and 
fare collection 
equipment 
necessary 
support 
infrastructure 
needed 
within the 
housing 
estate. 
bridges, electrical 
lines and 
telecommunicati
ons distribution 
network and 
associated ducts  
20 km of coastal 
road.  
Provision of 
facilities (street 
lights, road 
signs, pedestrian 
bridges and 
drainages)  
Project Cost 4.5 billion naira 
for the 
construction of 
bus lanes and        
1 billion naira 
for acquisition of 
buses 
US$400 
million for 
purchase of 
rolling stock 
NA 61.19 billion 
naira (US$386 
million) 
Estimated 
amount of 50 
billion naira 
(US$333 
million) 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the Local Regeneration Partnerships (Author, 2017) 
 
 
 
5. Discussion and Managerial Implications  
  
Accountability and Transparency practices in the Formation Stage of Nigerian Local 
Regeneration Partnerships 
 
The general consensus among participants interviewed in the five partnerships investigated was 
that transparency in the open tendering process was an early signal of accountable activities 
and a way to enhance future partnership working. A participant asserted that transparency in 
the selection process signalled fairness in the partner selection: 
“If it is not transparent it is not likely that the project will attract the best investors who 
will want a transparent competitive bidding process that is very transparent to 
everybody.”           [Director, Regulatory Agency] 
Another concern raised by participants is that funding institutions needed to have clear 
evidence of a transparent tendering and bidding process and the resultant selection of partners. 
These transparency concerns were also shared in the Rail Partnership, however, the partners 
involved were determined that there should be openness among partners as well as the 
unrestricted sharing of information to enhance partnership working. A participant from the 
partnership stated that such transparent practice meant that: 
“At least I know after we [transport agency] signed the contract agreement, this 
consortium [the private sector developers] is not going to mess us up, because I know 
they can deliver, I trust the people it's bringing into the job”.       
       [Deputy Director C, Transport Agency] 
The research findings further indicated that there is usually hesitation to provide finance by 
funding institutions, especially international funding institutions when clarity is not evident in 
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the entire process and could sometimes withdraw their investment interests. One of the 
participants from a local funding institution stated that: 
“Now what we [the banking community] are trying to do is getting involved very, very 
early in the process to some extent we can try to spearhead it so that the project is 
watertight as much as possible”.               [Director, Transaction Advisory  Services] 
The participant however further emphasises that it is not possible to check every activity that 
has been done in the partnership, but that there is a system in place that allows for checks and 
balances of the partners’ activities. The author infers that perhaps that might be the reason, why 
in the Rail Partnership, it was important for the Transport Agency to select private sector 
partners that had a good understanding of the rail sector, in terms, of their experience and 
capability. The Private Sector Specialist, [Funding Institution A] stated that it was also 
important to consider from the onset what the performance determinants were in order to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the Rail Partnership. 
For instance, in the Kappa Housing Partnership, a participant from one of the government’s 
Reforms Agency [Team Leader, Reforms Agency] acknowledged that there is a general 
perception among the public partners that the private sector partners are seen to enter into the 
partnerships with the aim to make loads of money. This the participant attributed to the way 
the agency had been structured and operated over the years, for instance frequent changes in 
management, poor accountability and corrupt practices. The Team Leader, Reforms Agency 
was also of the opinion that not having a clear structure right from the commencement of the 
partnership might be due to the way the contractual agreement had being negotiated. In 
addition, the participant believed more efforts needed to have been made to ensure that the 
partners were sufficiently informed about the goals of the partnership and the individual 
responsibilities and obligations of the partners. According to the participant, the private 
partners on the other hand also see the Housing Agency has been overbearing, especially in 
cases where the Housing Authority tries to influence the decision process of the partnership 
working. 
In a bid to ensure better accountability and transparency, specifically in terms of equity and 
fairness in future activities of the Kappa Housing Authority, a restructuring of the Housing 
Authority has commenced. The new structure aims to change the nature of the ownership of 
Kappa Housing Authority and to help initiate better accountability and good governance 
procedures. The Reform Agency working alongside the Housing Authority has begun putting 
together a board of committee members to include external consultants and representatives 
from all relevant stakeholders who would bring on board their expertise. An audit committee 
would also be established and a PPP sub-committee at the board level.  The Assistant Director 
B, Reforms Agency acknowledged that the Housing Authority already has some form of PPP 
structure, but the Reform Agency does not feel they meet international best practises. The 
Reform Agency has set out to restructure the Housing Authority to create an environment that 
would enable the government entity to be able to carry out PPP arrangement more effectively.     
In essence, as part of the restructuring, new PPP procedures, guidelines and the evaluation 
criteria were being agreed at the time of the data collection. According to these participants, 
the new procedures and guidelines would see documents used during the pre-tendering stage, 
being sent to the inaugurated board of committee members for review and feedback and 
eventually for acceptance. These new procedures are to ensure that the entire process meets 
international best practices for PPP arrangements. It is envisaged that with the restructuring of 
the Housing Authority, the PPP contract agreements would be well spelt out so that partners 
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enter into the partnership with a clear picture of the objectives that need to be achieved. It 
would also address issues with regards to how risks should be mitigated and how the investment 
on return would be handled. In addressing the problems with accountability, an audit committee 
is to be established as well as a PPP sub-committee at the board level. 
In the Gamma District Partnership, the Director, [Transaction Advisory Services] from the 
consultancy team stated that the situation between the public and private sector partners was a 
bit tense at the beginning of the partnership and that the partners were wary of each other. The 
private developer right from the commencement of the partnership had made it clear that they 
wanted full disclosure of information and decisions from the government and that the private 
housing developer claimed that they would also be willing to share information. According to 
the participant, providing necessary documentation or information in respect of the partners’ 
activities prior to meetings was meant to indicate that the partners were committed to the 
success of the partnership. This is line with the argument proposed by Charlier, Glover and 
Robertson (2009) that with a basis of transparency, partners will be more willing to exercise 
the tolerance and perseverance necessary to see the partnership through difficult times. 
However, this was not the case during the course of the partnership working, conflict resulted 
in among the partners when the sub-contractors with the private developing company were 
reluctant to release the architecture drawings for the constructions, so that the Housing 
Authority could determine whether they were in accordance with what had been negotiated in 
the contract and also if they were up to the expected standards. The situation led to the suspicion 
of the Housing Authority thinking that the private contractors wanted to cut corners. The 
participant further stated: 
“…the private developers had not released the drawings because they were of the 
opinion that the Housing Authority was going to use it as a means to re-negotiate the 
contract.”  [Director, Transaction Advisory Services] 
A legal consultant [CEO, Legal Advisory Services] to the private developer acknowledged that 
perhaps the Gamma District Development Authority should have made the private partners; 
specifically, the sub-contractors understand why they asked for the information and perhaps 
emphasised that it was aimed at enhancing the partnership working and not for it to be used 
against them. 
 
Accountability and Transparency and Concerns in the Implementation Stage of Nigeria 
Local Regeneration Partnerships  
According to Forrer et. al., (2010), public sector partners need to consider the mechanisms 
most appropriate to hold their private sector partners accountable, alongside how they would 
be accountable to their private sector partners. The Kappa Housing Authority provided an 
insightful case of the challenges faced with issues of accountability which had affected its 
capability to fully implement partnership arrangements. Despite the feasibility studies carried 
out to inform the decision of the appropriate location to construct the housing units and design 
models. A participant [Team Leader, Reforms Agency] from the Reform Agency stated that 
there had been situations when houses had been built in a particular location with no potential 
off-takers offering to purchase the houses usually because of the choice of locations. According 
to the participant: 
“Location matters as the decision that goes into this is such that there must be a 
guaranteed market for the houses in the location and the design meets local 
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preferences. Even middle class people, they still have those cultural issues, they would 
not buy certain type of houses, and those types of issues have to be taken into 
consideration”.                           [Team Leader,  Reforms Agency] 
Some of these situations had resulted because of influence from top ranking government 
officials who exercise their administration powers and decide that the housing project be 
constructed in a particular locality within their jurisdiction and the directive is given for that to 
happen. In other words, sometimes state governors want the housing projects to be sited in the 
states they govern, to give the impression to the local electorate that the State Government is 
investing in infrastructure development.   
A reason was given by participants about why there seemed to be the heavy influence of the 
government in the decision making in the partnerships. The first concern was that the private 
sector infrastructure developers usually did not want to get into the bad books of government. 
According to these participants, private sector access to large scale and highly financed projects 
in Nigeria is based on access to contacts and connections within the government, for instance, 
being politically connected, also locally termed ‘who you know syndrome’. According to a 
participant from the BT Partnership: 
“We are in a country where the private sector relies heavily on government patronage, 
so also the banks rely heavily on government patronage”.        
        [Deputy Director A, Transport Agency]  
Suggested by participants is that the situation illustrated above may have led the private sector 
partners to become complacent to the actions and decisions of the institutions representing the 
government, in what is locally termed ‘a wait and see attitude’. The researcher infers that these 
situations which typically characterise the traditional procurement method of infrastructure 
development are evidently being seen to be seeping into partnership arrangements, thereby 
defeating the very purpose of partnership working.  
To emphasise the above points, a participant commented that:  
“One of the important things is that you don’t want to have problems with sustainability, 
because when you sign up to something, it is about good governance, contract sanctity, 
ensuring that what is signed is done, if you do that you would have sustainability. So 
basically, it comes down to the contract and the governance environment that facilitates 
contract sanctity”.                                                               [Director, Regulatory Agency] 
The participant further attributed the issues of accountability and some corrupt practices to the 
extent of political interference in the operations of the agency to the constant changes in the 
leadership and management of the Housing Authority.  
In the Bus Transport Partnership, while it is the aim of the government to improve the state’s 
transport infrastructure. It is also at the top of the agenda for the government to ensure that they 
safe guard the citizenry and the environment because the government is seen as the last resort 
and protector of the people from the profit-making motives of the private sector. However, a 
participant [Lead, Transaction Advisory Services] was of the opinion that in the Toll Road 
partnership, the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which was set up might have ran more 
efficiently in delivering on the project if the state government had not interfered with its 
decisions. The participant is of the believe that this might have also led the state government 
to have an upper hand in the process of being able to buy out the private partners’ shares when 
the partnership was terminated.  
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Accountability and Transparency Concerns in the Delivery Stage of Nigeria Local 
Regeneration Partnerships  
Successful collaboration between partners is integral to the partnership working and is tasked 
with increasing accountability and transparency requiring partners to set continuous goals and 
provide evidence of their performance (Merminod and Rowe, 2012). As Slater et. al. (2007) 
suggested, that the reflective processes of monitoring and the commencement of evaluating the 
collaborative process are important in assessing the partnership’s performance, but possibly 
are more important in understanding and developing the partnership working. Thus, if the 
reflective processes are acted upon, can give rise to partnership learning, both across the 
partnership and within partners’ the individual organisations. 
Participants recognised that the partners needed to meet their obligations as at when due, for 
PPPs to work in the country such that all the partners needed to understand that is could only 
be achieved when all the partners met their obligations. Participants also stated that carrying 
the citizens along is very important throughout the various stages of the partnership; however, 
there is no legislative procedure in the ICRC Act that gives an indication as to what needs to 
be done. A participant stated that:  
“The ICRC Act says nothing about it, most states government laws say nothing about 
it. If it is driven by legislation it would help, otherwise people just have to get more 
sense into it.”                   [CEO, Legal Advisory Services] 
Another participant further commented that: 
“It is not the responsibility of the private sector to deal with these citizens that is the 
work of the government”.            [Managing Director, Funding Institution]  
In being accountable to the local community, it was important for the Transport Agency in the 
BT Partnership that the public were made aware of the necessary information about the BT 
Partnership activities. The feedback provided by the members of the public were acted on and 
communicated to private partners with the aim of improving bus transport services. According 
to participants in the partnership, it is a way of ensuring that the Transport Authority is 
accountable for what it has set out to achieve among partners. It was the opinion of the Deputy 
Director C, Transport Agency] that the government had a responsibility to ensure that the 
private sector actually delivered on the project. Another participant [Deputy Director A, 
Transport Agency] reckoned that the Lagos Government has done well in terms of transport 
infrastructure and in terms of protecting the populace.  
Deputy Director B, from the Rail Partnership was of the opinion that the efforts been put into 
engaging, communicating and informing the populace is mainly because it is a World Bank 
partly sponsored project. There is an amount of the World Bank funds that is budgeted and 
allocated to funding this exercise because of the importance the World Bank’s places on 
information, education and communication. The participant further stated that it is important 
that the community has a proper understanding of what the Transport Authority is trying to do, 
by educating the populace. 
As part of the Transport Agency’s communications strategy also involves external relations, 
such that offices from the public relations department hold surveys with members of various 
communities. Four television shows which are aired for half an hour every week sponsored by 
the Transport Authority where updates are given, live interviews are aired and live interaction 
with the members of the public are held to address going concerns. There are also social media 
updates of the on-going project on the Facebook. A participant further stated that: 
 
Forces for partnership working or farce: accountability and transparency practices in Nigerian local regeneration partnerships  
 
13 
 
“They give us updates about their experiences, we also have a monthly meeting with 
the leaders, they tell us for instance, you don’t have enough traffic management 
protocols, in fact that is part of the environment safeguard issues.”          
        [Deputy Director B, Transport Agency] 
The participant stated that:  
“I think we would reserve judgement on that because we haven’t seen the full outcome. 
So there are problems with driving the process through, and it is very slow and there 
are many, to that extent I won’t say there is full confidence in the process just yet at the 
Federal level”.                  [Managing Director, Funding Institution]  
 
In the delivery of the Gamma District Development, a participant was of the opinion that there 
were reservations about the implementation process due to delays and that at the Federal level 
there was limited confidence in the partnership.  
In an effort to promote accountability in the partnership, a participant explained that: 
“… because of the bank funding that is involved, we are being monitored closely to 
ensure that the money is being used for what it is supposed to be used for.”   
 [Lead, Transaction Advisory Services] 
An independent engineer in November 2012 in line with the partnership agreement was 
integrated into the partnership to promote a transparent collaborative process, such that there 
were clear indications of the roles of the partners, clear procedures of their operations and 
decision making processes and that the resultant implications from those decisions were clearly 
observed (ICRC Annual Report, 2012). The monitoring was also deemed important in the event 
that there was an arbitration process or that the partners went to court for any litigation reasons.  
Likewise, in the BT Partnership, various evaluation techniques were employed in the 
partnership working to promote accountability. The effects of the operations of the local 
regeneration project is taking into consideration in order to protect the citizenry, such as 
environmental degradation and the health and safety of the citizens such that they do not suffer 
the consequence of the infrastructure development. To help mitigate the occurrence of protests 
and to have close contact with the local community, some corporate social responsibility 
projects to benefit the residents along the bus route corridor were developed. One of the agreed 
actions from the contractual agreement extra services provided by private partners on the toll 
road has been to provide free toll services for vehicular break down on any stretch of the road; 
this is with a means to build close community relations.  
In the Kappa Housing Partnerships, participants voiced that it would no longer be business as 
usual once the Housing Authority gets restructured. Consequently, in line with the new 
corporate governance changes that would include the mechanisms for assessing Housing 
Authority’s performance as well as holding them accountable. There would also be an inclusion 
of performance agreement within the memorandum of understanding. The evaluation of the 
entire partnership working would also be introduced at the end of the local regeneration 
projects and it would be accessed to determine if the partnership was able to deliver on the set 
objectives and in terms of the concession agreement. It would also involve the appointment of 
an Independent Estate Valuer to join the PPP team. In the Kappa Housing Partnership, when 
the housing units was handed over to the Housing Authority for servicing facilities 
management, operations and maintenance, a resident association was set up and involved in 
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the resident associations in the management of the Estates. According to the Deputy General 
Manager, [PPP Unit], one of the Housing Authority’s statuary functions is to get the residents 
association involved in making decisions affecting the management of the entire Estate. In light 
of this meetings are held periodically, with members of the resident association and officers 
from the Housing Authority Estate Department.  
One of the participants [Legal Adviser, Reforms Agency] indicated that the performance 
criteria of the Housing Authority in terms of partnership arrangements would be agreed among 
partners in accordance to a new structure proffered by the regulatory agency working with them 
to corporationalize the Housing Authority. The participant further stated that: 
“It is a process whereby we can put in place appropriate structures for the direction 
and management of the partnership in order to increase long-term shareholder value 
and enhancing corporate performance and accountability while taking into account the 
interest of the citizenry” 
In addition, an Assistant Director A, [Reforms Agency] commented that he was of the opinion 
that the bottom line was that when it comes to performance reporting, that at the end of the day, 
there must be indication of good governance, transparency, appropriate pricing, accountability 
in those documents.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The extent of accountability and transparency practices in each of the local regeneration 
partnerships gives a strong sense that the basis of success is the contractual commitment of 
each partner organisation. The expectation is that partners execute what had been agreed upon 
in contractual agreements and are able to deliver on the agreed objectives. This argument has 
been put forward by Tomkins, (2001) that in some partnership arrangements, the contract plays 
a more crucial role in governing the relationship between the partners. In these contexts, 
contract acts as a governance tool as prescribed by law and it focuses on the technical and 
easily measurable aspects of the partnership (Laing and Lian, 2005). In other words, 
accountability and transparency would emerge as a consequence of partners’ confidence in the 
‘sanctity of contracts’ that ensures what has been agreed upon is implemented and sustained. 
Also, that there is an appropriate governance environment that facilitates ‘sanctity of contracts’ 
and that all partners carry out their roles. 
The practicality of this, is for the private sector to keep to the time frame for the achievement 
of each milestone and to keep to budget and for public sector organisations to honour their 
regulatory obligations. Any deviation from these expectations, makes investment in local 
regeneration projects an unattractive proposition for investors and funding institutions given 
the huge costs involved. Taking for instance, the Kappa Federal Housing Partnership and the 
Gamma District Development Partnership where it is evident that there were uncertainties 
among the partners and challenges in the partnership operations, according to Huxham and 
Vangen (2005) and Das and Teng (1998) the partners must be able to form modest expectations 
about desired outcomes, the more modest the desired outcomes expected and the lower the 
level of risk, the greater the chance that expectations will be met. The author argues that 
creating accountable policies and practices could allow partners address these uncertainties by 
trying to learn more about individual organisation objectives for going into the partnerships as 
well as way of working. The aim therefore should be for public organisations to make a 
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commitment to ensure transparency in the selection and bidding process, as well as in the 
evaluation process of potential private partner organisations.  
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